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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTIONS AS STATE ACTION
Jackson v. Statler Foundation
A party seeking vindication of his civil rights may maintain a
civil action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 In asserting
a section 1983 claim, however, the plaintiff must show that his con-
stitutional rights have been abridged by a person acting "under color
of" state law or custom; in effect, he must satisfy the state action
requirement of the fourteenth amendment.2
The doctrine of "state action" as a prerequisite to the application
of federal civil rights laws originated with the Civil Rights Cases.3
There, the Supreme Court instructed that invasion of a person's rights
by an individual is merely a "private wrong," not within the purview
of the fourteenth amendment.4 However, as the state action doctrine
has evolved in our jurisprudence, particularly in the field of racial
discrimination,5 its parameters have been broadened to include much
activity at least "private" in appearance. Thus, for example, a finding
142 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), set down the
following often cited definition which has been utilized in connection with the state
action doctrine:
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken "under
color of" state law.
id. at 326.2
"In cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the
same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). See also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 163 (1970), wherein the Court stated:
Mhe legislative history of § I of the 1871 Act, (the Ku Klux Klan Act] the lineal
ancestor of § 1983 ... indicates that the provision in question here was intended
to encompass only conduct supported by state action.
3 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In these five cases, the first and second sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 were declared unconstitutional because they afforded a cause of action against
private individuals under the fourteenth amendment.
4 rd. at 17.
5 "Almost all applications of the Fourteenth Amendment to private conduct based
upon a finding of 'state action' have involved an attack upon 'private' racial discrimi-
nation." Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392 (N.D. Ind. 1970) (mem.), aff'd, 445
F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). See Burke and Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and
Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1003;
1035-36 (1973).
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of state action may be appropriate when the "private" offender is en-
gaged in a joint activity with the state.6 State action has also been
found where the state was perceived as compelling,7 authorizing, or
encouraging8 private discrimination, either directly or indirectly. Fur-
6 This concept of joint action was fully explored in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), wherein the Court found a sufficient nexus between the racially
discriminatory activity and the state government. In Burton, the appellant was denied
service, solely on the basis of race, in the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, Inc., a private restaurant
located on premises leased from the Parking Authority, an agency of the state. The Court
was of the opinion that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-
obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."
Id. at 722. The Court accordingly recognized that the restaurant was in a publicly owned
building devoted to "public uses," that public funds were spent for necessary repairs,
that many mutual benefits were enjoyed by the Parking Authority and restaurant, and
that any improvements in the leasehold made by the lessee would be tax exempt as the
fee was held by a government agency. The Court concluded: "The State has so far insinu-
ated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as
a joint participant in the challenged activity .... " Id. at 725.
Burton thus established the "symbiotic relationship" test for use in the search for
state action. However, the majority was careful to restrict its holding to the particular
facts at bar: "Mhe conclusions drawn from the facts and circumstances of this record are
by no means declared as universal truths on the basis of which every state leasing agree-
ment is to be tested." Id. This cautious approach had been criticized as affording no
guidelines for settling similar disputes.
In Burton the Court selected a highly particularistic approach. This increases the
burden of explanation, because easy generalities will not suffice -difficulties will
be presented in later cases in which the state action problem is conceptually the
same but the underlying social problem is different. Instead of meeting this
burden, the Court, by emphasizing all the facts, appears to have done its best to
decide a case without creating a precedent.
Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61 CoLuM.
L. REv. 1458, 1466 (1961). It is submitted that such a factual emphasis is indicative of the
Court's reluctance to further expand the state action doctrine.
7 The compulsion cases have generally dealt with specific state statutes fostering racial
discrimination. See, e.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 US. 244 (1963) (city ordinance
required segregation by race in restaurants); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per
curiam) (state statute provided for segregation in restaurants). Cf. Robinson v. Florida,
378 U.S. 153 (1964) (nonsegregated restaurants burdened under State Board of Health
regulations). In Turner, the pertinent state statute was not challenged, and so, the case
was decided on the authority of Burton. 369 U.S. at 353.
However, in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), the Court held that a
state statute is not necessary for a finding of state "compulsion" under the fourteenth
amendment, since "a state official might act to give a custom the force of law in a variety
of ways .... " Id. at 172. Moreover, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), stands for the
proposition that judicial enforcement of a private, racially discriminatory covenant is
sufficient compulsion by the state to be violative of the fourteenth amendment.
8 In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), blacks deprived of the right to vote in
primaries conducted by the Jaybird Party solely on the ground of race claimed violation
of their fifteenth amendment rights. The Court saw this conduct by the political party
as a means by which the state circumvented the prohibitions of the fifteenth amendment.
Id. at 469. Additionally, in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), a California consti-
tutional provision repealed statutes banning racial discrimination in the selling or leasing
of residential property and granted complete discretion to the individual homeowner.
The Court deemed the provision invalid under the fourteenth amendment on the theory
that the state is prohibited from "authorizing" or "encouraging" private racial discrimi-
nation.
More recent cases, not dealing with the political process or equal access to housing,
[Vol. 49:283
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1973 TERM
thermore, in certain situations, a private individual's actions can take
on the character of a public function so as to transform his acts into
state action.9
suggest that the Court has been unwilling to use the Reitman theory for a broad expansion
of the state action concept. In Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), land had been con-
veyed to the city of Macon, Georgia, under a testamentary trust for use as a park for
white persons only. After the Court had earlier ruled in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966), that due to its public character, the park could not be operated under racial
restrictions, it was closed. The Georgia courts ruled thereafter that the trust had failed
and the property reverted to the testator's heirs. In affirming, the Court held that the
petitioner's fourteenth amendment rights were not violated by the refusal of the Georgia
courts to apply the cy pres doctrine to save the trust by removing the racial restrictions
from the wili. 396 U.S. at 446.
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 898 U.S. 144 (1970), petitioner, having been refused
service at respondent's lunch counter because she was in the company of blacks, was
arrested for vagrancy upon leaving the premises. In bringing a § 1988 action, petitioner
alleged that she was refused service pursuant to a local custom, and that the refusal of
service and her subsequent arrest were the product of a conspiracy between the respondent
and the police. The lower courts, on a motion for summary judgment, dismissed the
complaint before trial. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the re-
spondent had not satisfied the burden of proof required for the grant of summary judg-
ment. In examining the "state custom" requirement under § 1983, the Court indicated that
the fourteenth amendment is violated only when the discriminatory act is compelled by
a state-enforced custom, id. at 171, that is, a custom which has "the force of law by virtue
of the persistent practices of state officials." Id. at 167.
In Palmer v. Thompson, 408 U.S. 217 (1971), the city of Jackson, Mississippi, upon
being ordered to desegregate its public recreational facilities, closed four city-owned pools,
and surrendered its lease on a fifth to the YMCA, which continued to operate the pool
on a segregated basis. Petitioners' demand that the pools be reopened and desegregated
was denied. The Court found no evidence that the state continued to be involved in the
funding or operation of the remaining segregated pool. Significantly, the Court implied
that the "encouragement" theory of state action set forth in Reitman is applicable only
when there is some evidence of an actual conspiracy between government officials and
private individuals. Id. at 223-24.
9 Marsh v. Alabama, 826 U.S. 501 (1946), is often cited for the proposition that acts
of a private entity can become municipal in nature, and thus fall within the ambit of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court therein, while holding that a state cannot impose
criminal sanctions on the distribution of religious literature on the streets of a company-
owned town, stated:
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it.
Id. at 506.
Similar facts confronted the Court in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 891 U.S. 308 (1968), wherein the Court, citing Marsh, held that privately
owned property may, in certain circumstances involving first amendment rights, be treated
as though it were public. Id. at 316-18. The Court found that defendant's shopping
center served as the community business block and held that the state could not enforce
its trespass laws so as to exclude individuals in violation of their first amendment rights.
The Court was careful to point out that its holding would not apply to property not
ordinarily open to the general public. Id. at 320.
Where racial discrimination is alleged under the "public function" theory of state
action, the Court has more readily found fourteenth amendment violations. The county
defendant in Griffin v. County School Bd., 877 U.S. 218 (1964), when ordered to desegregate,
appropriated no funds for public schools and by means of a private foundation operated
schools for white children only, providing tuition grants and tax credits. The Court found
that the operation of government-supported segregated schools constituted a denial of
1975]
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Mr. Justice Douglas has urged that state regulation of private
enterprise, as evidenced by state licensing and supervision, should be
viewed as state action.'0 However, the Supreme Court's decision in
Moose Lodge v. Irvis" can fairly be viewed as a definitive rejection
of this theory. The appellee in Moose Lodge, having been refused
service at appellant's private club because of his race, brought a sec-
tion 1983 suit claiming that the issuance of a state liquor license, with
its attendant supervision, constituted state action. Finding no state
action, the Court was unwilling to expand the scope of the equal
protection clause,12 and its decision has been viewed as signalling a
halt to the search for state action in the face of "private" racial dis-
crimination.13
In Jackson v. Statler Foundation,14 the Second Circuit considered
the extent of the state action doctrine in light of Moose Lodge. Rev-
the petitioners' right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. In Evans v.
Newton, 582 U.S. 296 (1966), the Court drew analogies to the company town in Marsh and
the elective process in Terry, and resolved:
Conduct that is formally "private" may become so entwined with governmental
policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to
the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.
Id. at 299.
10 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 384-86 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 282 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); Garner v.
Louisiana, 268 U.S. 157, 184 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
11407 U.S. 163 (1972).
12 The Court distinguished Burton, concluding that "while Eagle was a public restau-
rant in a public building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in a private building."
Id. at 175. But see Justice Douglas' dissent wherein he points out that liquor licenses in
Pennsylvania are issued pursuant to a strict quota system, and at various times during the
week only private dubs are permitted to serve liquor, thus being afforded a state-encouraged
monopoly of sorts. Id. at 182-83.
One passage in the majority opinion may well signify the approach the Court will
adopt in the future when presented with a § 1983 claim:
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise private
entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity
receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to
state regulation in any degree whatever.
Id. at 173.
13 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HIv. L. Rav. 1, 74-75 (1972), wherein
the author states:
The fact that the Moose Lodge Court, unlike the Court in earlier cases, did not
take advantage of plausible opportunities to identify the challenged conduct as
state action may indicate that the expansion of the reach of the equal protection
clause, which has taken place over the last decade, has come to a halt.
14496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 2452 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975).
The opinion in the instant case was first handed down as a one paragraph per curiam
opinion on December 4, 1973. Judge Friendly requested a poll of judges in regular service
regarding en banc reconsideration. The panel asked that no vote be taken until it pro-
duced a revised opinion, which was circulated on April 5, 1974. Only half of the judges
voted for reconsideration en banc, so pursuant to the Federal Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(c) (1970), the request was denied. The statute mandates that a majority of the circuit
judges in active service agree to the rehearing. See Second Circuit Note, 48 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 372 (1973).
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erend Donald L. Jackson, appearing pro se, sued thirteen charitable
foundations in the Buffalo, New York, area, alleging racial discrimi-
nation. Over a period of three years, the plaintiff had sent form letters
to approximately 14,900 foundations requesting that each organization
name him a member of its board of directors, that scholarships be
given to his children, and that grants be made to his own foundation.
When the defendants declined his requests, he brought a section 1983
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and the
revocation of their tax exempt status as charitable foundations. 5 The
Second Circuit, in remanding the appellant's complaint to the district
court which had dismissed it on the authority of Moose Lodge, held
that a finding of state action might be warranted by virtue of the tax
exemptions granted appellees as charitable foundations. 6
In its unanimous decision, the Second Circuit panel 7 noted that
courts have more readily found state action when the allegedly offen-
sive conduct of a tax exempt organization was racially discriminatory. 8
For example, in McGlotten v. Connally,9 tax benefits granted to fra-
ternal orders whose membership policies excluded nonwhites were held
to be violative of the fifth amendment.2 0 The courts in Pitts v. De-
15 Appellant Jackson additionally challenged an alleged pattern of racially discrimina-
tory conduct by the foundations, and sought an order mandating the surrender of their
assets to the United States Treasury. The court summarily held that the lower court
properly dismissed this claim since the appellant could not seek such a judicial order.
496 F.2d at 636. See Wolkstein v. Port of New York Authority, 178 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J.
1959).
The complaint was deficient on its face as to revocation of federal and state tax
exemptions due to its failure to join parties indispensable to such a suit. In order to
maintain a suit seeking such revocation, the Secretary of the Treasury and the New York
Tax Commissioner would have to be joined. The Second Circuit noted that joinder of
these parties might have obviated the jurisdictional challenge premised upon no "state
action." 496 F.2d at 626 n.2, citing Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub
nom., Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (mem.).
16496 F.2d at 629.
17Judge Smith authored the opinion of the panel, w.%ich also included Judges Mans-
field and Oakes.
18 Many cases can be cited for the proposition that "state action" will more likely
be found when the conduct is racially discriminatory. See, eg., Lefcourt v. Legal Aid
Society, 445 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392
F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1969); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp.
448, 459 n.58 (D.D.C. 1972); Bell v. Georgia Dental Ass'n, 231 F. Supp. 229 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
See generally Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 80 (1967); Hemphill,
State Action and Civil Rights, 23 MfIERca L. Rlv. 519 (1972); Comment, State Action and
Private Education, 11 J. FAMmY L. 765, 772 (1972).
19 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
20 In the course of its opinion, the court stated: "Congress does not violate the Consti-
tution by failing to tax private discrimination where there is no other act of Government
involvement." Id. at 458 (emphasis in original). The court went on to distinguish the
types of tax exemptions challenged, and concluded that the exemptions granted nonprofit
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partment of Revenue2' and Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue22
similarly found that the granting of tax exemptions to racially exclu-
sive organizations violated the fourteenth amendment. In Smith v.
YMCA, 23 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that defen-
dant's tax exempt status, when weighed with other indicia of state
involvement, supported a section 1983 claim alleging racial discrimi-
nation. On the other hand, in Powe v. Miles,24 the suspension of four
students for demonstrating in opposition to a direct order from the
Dean of Alfred University, a private tax-exempt institution, did not
constitute state action sufficient to warrant civil rights relief under
section 1983.25 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit, in Browns v. Mitch-
ell,26 when presented with a factually similar suit under section 1983,
held that even though the private university enjoyed a special tax
exemption, 27 this was "far short of the requisite State involvement." 28
dubs were provided on a neutral basis, and thus as to these exemptions there was no "state
action." Id. at 462.
21 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
22 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972).
28 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972). Plaintiffs challenged defendant's policy of excluding
nonwhites from participation in recreational activities sponsored by defendant.
24407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
25 The students sought injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief for alleged
restraints on their right of free speech. Id. at 79. Distinguishing Marsh and Terry, the
court found that the university did not perform a "public function" so as to render its
conduct state action. Id. at 80. Furthermore, although the university received direct finan-
cial assistance from the state and federal governments, the court concluded that this aid
was minimal, and dismissed the contention that state regulation of the university created
a sufficient nexus for purposes of the first and fourteenth amendments. In so doing, the
court stated: "[TMhe state must be involved not simply with some activity of the institution
alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the
injury." Id. at 81. Having found that the limited financial assistance afforded by the state
did not constitute state action, the court left undecided the question as to whether this
might not be the case if the alleged conduct were racially discriminatory. Id.
Four separate colleges comprise Alfred University, and the court did find that the
students suspended from the New York State College of Ceramics presented a different
case. Because this state-supported institution was operated under contract with the state,
the conduct of the Dean of Students did constitute "state action" for purposes of the
§ 1983 claim. Id. at 82-83. However, the court went on to find that such conduct was not
violative of any constitutional rights of the students. Id. at 84-85.
26409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
27 In addition to exemptions granted all other religious and charitable corporations,
the university involved was exempted from taxes on its income from noneducational in-
come producing property. Id. at 595.
28 Id. at 596. The court also remarked:
[T]here is no suggestion that the claimed involvement is in any way associated
with the challenged activity.. . .The benefits conferred, however characterized,
have no bearing on the challenged actions beyond the perpetuation of the insti-
tution itself.
Id.
In Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir.
1971), two students who had been suspended from a parochial high school for violation
of a school disciplinary rule sought to be reinstated by an injunction under § 1983. The
[Vol. 49:283
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Finally, the appellants in Marker v. Shultz,29 unsuccessfully challenged
the tax-exempt status of unions involved in political activities, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia finding that "[a] tax
exemption is consistent with a 'benevolent neutrality' and government
non-involvement with the exempted organization."30
The Jackson court therefore concluded that an allegation of racial
discrimination warrants a less stringent test for the granting of relief
under the state action doctrine,31 and proceeded to set down such a
"test" to be applied in determining whether State action is present.
The court specified the following five factors to be weighed, indicating
that a finding of state action may still be warranted should one factor
be absent:
(1) the degree to which the 'private' organization is dependent
on governmental aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of the gov-
ernmental regulatory scheme; (3) whether that scheme connotes
government approval of the activity or whether the assistance is
merely provided to all without such connotation; (4) the extent
to which the organization serves a public function or acts as a
surrogate for the State; (5) whether the organization has legiti-
court, citing Powe, concluded that regulation of a private school's educational standards
and the tax exemptions granted the school did not constitute state involvement in the
challenged activity. The court recognized that a less stringent standard of sufficient state
action is employed when racial discrimination is alleged. 314 F. Supp. at 1392. See also
Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conf., 864 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (alleged sex dis-
crimination, no state action found); Penny v. Kalamazoo Christian High School Ass'n, 48
Mich. App. 614, 210 N.W.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1973) (government regulation and "public
function" arguments failed to establish state action).
29485 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
80 Id. at 1006. The court found Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and Moose
Lodge persuasive and concluded:
What was involved was the determination by Congress to keep the tax exemption
of dues and contributions in a neutral stance, rather than to embroil the tax laws
and the agencies administering them into involvement with and surveillance of
the political activities of the unions.
485 F.2d at 1007. It is arguable that the tax exemptions granted charitable institutions
are aimed at promoting the same kind of neutrality with respect to the dispensation of
private charitable grants.
In finding no state action in a suit by a labor union to compel publication of an
editorial advertisement, the Seventh Circuit noted:
The use tax exemption ... does represent a "state involvement" in the limited
sense that any tax exemption does, but not to a degree which constitutes state
participation in the conduct or action of the enterprise granted the exemption.
Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 453 F.2d 470,
477 (7th Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971). The Seventh Circuit
is thus in accord with the Second Circuit's treatment of state financial aid as enunciated
in Powe. It is also noteworthy that in Amalgamated, the tax exemption was just one factor
set forth by plaintiff as a basis for the finding of state action. The defendant additionally
received revenue from publishing legal notices, and some of its press facilities were located
in public buildings. 453 F.2d at 477.
31496 F.2d at 628. See Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1142 (2d Cir.
1973); cases cited in note 18 supra.
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mate claims to recognition as a 'private' organization in associa-
tional or other constitutional terms.8 2
Applying the test to the defendant foundations, the court sug-
gested that state action was present under all five criteria. However,
since the record before the court was meager, it was left to the district
court, on remand, to finally determine whether the test was in fact
satisfied.88 It appeared to the panel that the first factor was established
in that tax exemptions, in general, constitute substantial assistance to
charitable foundations.84 The court suggested that the second criterion
was met since, under the 1969 Tax Reform Act, tax-exempt founda-
tions are subject to an intrusive governmental regulatory scheme.s
The court placed particular reliance upon the provision of the Act
which mandates the distribution of grants in an "objective and non-
discriminatory" manner and subjects offending grants to an "excise
tax."3 6 However, the court conceded that these provisions were de-
signed to combat nepotism, not to prevent racial discrimination. 7
32 496 F.2d at 629.
83 Id. at 634. The record before the court was more detailed as to defendant Buffalo
Foundation, and so the court was able to find that as to this institution, "the balance
must be struck somewhat differently." Id. The bylaws of this foundation provide that four
members of its seven-member Governing Committee be appointed by public officials. The
court, viewing this procedure as a means of involving the public in the foundation's
activities, found that "[t]his participation is neither insignificant nor neutral," id. at 635,
and concluded that on remand, a finding of state action might be warranted even in the
absence of other indicia of state involvement.
There is case law support for the court's finding of state action as to defendant
Buffalo Foundation. See Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230
(1957) (per curiam) (administration of a racially discriminatory trust by a city agency was
held to be violative of the fourteenth amendment); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (en banc) (recordation of a racially restrictive covenant held to be state action
in that it implied government approval).
84 496 F.2d at 629. See, e.g., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 n.37 (D.D.C.
1972), and authorities cited therein.
The Jackson court held that since § 1983 proscribes only conduct by the state, see,
e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1973); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647, 650 n.2 (1963), only state tax exemptions were to be examined on remand. In
analyzing the ramifications of tax exempt status, however, the court looked exclusively
to the federal exemptions. Since the two exemptions "are dearly linked in practice . . .
and in purpose," 496 F.2d at 635, the findings as to the federal system would be applicable.
The relevant New York State provisions are: N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 208-9(a)(4), 615 (Mc-
Kinney 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1974), regarding income and corporate tax deductions;
id. § 249-c(3), which provides that bequests are exempt from estate tax if the recipient
corporation meets the specifications embodied therein; and id. § 1230, which exempts such
organizations from local taxation. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LmW § 421 (McKinney 1972)
(non-profit organizations) exempts such charitable organizations from property taxes.
35 496 F.2d at 630. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1970)).
3 496 F.2d at 632; 26 U.S.C. § 4945(g) (1970).
37 496 F.2d at 633. The court further observed that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was
partially aimed at preventing some foundations from aiding racial minorities. Id. at 633
n.15. Evidence of such intent is found in those provisions prohibiting foundations from
[Vol. 49:283
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The court, moreover, decided that the government's relationship with
the foundations is not a neutral one. Since organizations must apply
for tax-exempt status, the panel felt that governmental approval of the
application equated with certification that the foundation is working
in the public interest. 8 The court further noted that the legislative
history behind charitable exemptions and deductions clarified that the
loss of government revenue was intended to be offset by the govern-
ment's relief from additional financial burdens. 9 Accordingly, the
court concluded that there is "something approaching a presumption
that foundation activities are public functions. ' 40 Finally, it appeared
to the court that the foundations could not assert the constitutional
right of a wholly private organization to be left alone.41 The court
recognized the right to dispose of one's property as one sees fit as the
only appropriate constitutional right assertable by the defendants.42
However, this right was held unavailable to the defendants in the
present context since it could not be exercised in a racially discrimi-
natory manner where the state was involved.43
Judge Friendly authored a vigorous dissenting opinion on behalf
of the three judges who favored en banc reconsideration. 44 They viewed
the panel's opinion as "analytically unsound, dangerously open-ended,
and at war with controlling precedent both in the Supreme Court
and in this circuit. '46 Moreover, they were concerned that the decision
could cause irreparable injury to private philanthropy. The dissenters
distinguished the McGlotten, Pitts, and Falkenstein cases, relied on
by the panel, as involving defendants who blatantly practiced forbid-
den racial discrimination by excluding blacks from membership in
ostensibly public clubs. Additionally, they emphasized that in those
cases the challenged activity was clearly government action and that
the plaintiffs therein were suing federal or state officials to force revo-
devoting assets to political purposes. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4945(d)(1) and (e) (1970). See, e.g., Hart,
Foundations and Social Activism: A Critical View, in Tim FTUma oF FoUNDAnONs 43
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
8 496 F.2d at 633.
89 See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938).
40 496 F.2d at 634.
41Id. The court reasoned that, while the foundations are not open to the public, as
was the restaurant in Burton, they are certainly not analogous to the private dub in Moose
Lodge.
42 Id.
43 Id. See Evans v. Newton, 382 US. 296, 301 (1966).
44 Judge Friendly's dissenting opinon was joined in by Judges Hays and Mulligan.
Judge Feinberg would also have granted a rehearing en banc.
45 496 F.2d at 636. The dissenters, however, agreed that as to defendant Buffalo Foun-
dation, a finding of state action was warranted since public officials actively participated
in its activities. Id. at 637 n.1. See note 33 supra.
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cation of tax benefits. In Jackson, however, the foundations themselves
were sued; thus a finding of state action in this instance would, in
effect, represent a holding that these private parties are agents of the
state. Such a determination was viewed as having a far more serious
and widespread effect than a finding that the state had improperly
fostered private discrimination.46
Judge Friendly was fearful that, due to the broad availability of
tax exemptions, the court's holding would have a deleterious effect
on the myriad organizations receiving such benefits, contrary to the
expressed intent of the Supreme Court. In Walz v. Tax Commission,47
the Court, in denying injunctive relief, held that the granting of prop-
erty tax exemptions by New York to religious organizations was not
violative of the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court, in rec-
ognizing that tax benefits are to be treated differently than other types
of government assistance, stated:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the govern-
ment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply
abstains from demanding that the church support the state.48
Furthermore, the dissent viewed Powe and Moose Lodge as mili-
tating against a finding of state action based on the mere fact that the
private activity is subject to state regulation. Judge Friendly argued
strongly that the lesson to be drawn from those cases is that a finding
of state action is appropriate only if the state regulatory scheme fosters
or encourages the alleged illegal conduct.49 The dissent also found the
"public function" theory of state action, as defined by the Supreme
Court in Marsh v. Alabama ° and Amalgamated Food Employees
Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,51 inapposite to the activities of the
defendant foundations. 52 In Marsh, the Court held that imposing
criminal sanctions for the distribution of religious literature on the
streets of a company-owned town was violative of the first and four-
teenth amendments. Similarly, in Logan Valley, the Court found de-
fendant's shopping center served as the community business block
and held that the state could not enforce its trespass laws so as to ex-
clude individuals from enjoying their first amendment rights. The
46496 F.2d at 637.
47397 U.S. 664 (1970).
48 Id. at 675.
49496 F.2d at 638. See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), discussed in notes
24-25 and accompanying text supra.
50326 U.S. 501 (1946), discussed in note 9 supra.
51391 U.. 308 (1968), discussed in note 9 supra.
52 496 F.2d at 639.
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dissent saw no equivalent "public function" being performed in Jack-
son.
Judge Friendly contrasted the approach of the Jackson panel with
the opinion he had authored almost simultaneously for a unanimous
panel in Wahba v. New York University.53 The appellant therein, a
nontenured associate professor at New York University School of Med-
icine, alleged violation of his first and fifth amendment rights when,
ow ing to a dispute with the defendant, chairman of his department,
his contract was not renewed. The project carried out by the parties
was financed by a direct federal grant, and the appellant asserted
that the relationship thereby created constituted state action. Judge
Friendly, finding no state action, examined the government's involve-
ment, distinguished cases involving alleged racial discrimination by
federal grantees, 54 and concluded that, in weighing the many variables
present, a court must consider "the value of preserving a private sector
free from the constitutional requirements applicable to government
institutions."55 Consistent with this view, Judge Friendly, in Jackson,
expressed his concern for "preserving an area of untrammeled choice
for private philanthropy .... ,,56
The dissent pointed out that, as evidenced by the record, several
of the defendant foundations had given generously to minority causes,
a fact ignored by the majority. However, even if grants had been made
on the basis of race, the dissent argued, the absence of sufficient state
action dictated that such conduct should not be viewed as constitu-
tionally impermissible. Finally, Judge Friendly concluded that the
Jackson decision would pose a serious threat to private charitable in-
stitutions, add to the enormous burden on federal courts, and inevi-
tably discourage donors who are unwilling to defend their charitable
gifts in court.57
Supreme Court treatment of the state action doctrine dearly in-
dicates that, as a general proposition, there is no established formula
for finding state action. Ultimately, each case turns on its particular
facts,58 the composition of the Court, and the balance which must
53 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974). Judges Moore and Anderson were the other members
of the Wahba panel.
54 See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en
banc), cert. denied, 876 U.S. 938 (1964), discussed in the text accompanying notes 60-62
infra; Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
55492 F.2d at 102. It must be noted, however, that Wahba's relationship to the case
at bar is undermined because the court therein was not faced with an allegation of racial
discrimination.
56496 F.2d at 639.
57 Id. at 640.
58 See note 6 supra.
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necessarily be struck between the constitutional right allegedly abridged
and the "private" person's right to be free of government intrusion.0
A discernible pattern does arise, however, upon a close analysis of the
state action cases involving alleged racially discriminatory conduct by
tax exempt organizations. Several district court holdings, not cited in
Jackson, differ from those cases carefully chosen as support by the
Jackson court. Both Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital0
and Wood v. Hogan6' involved alleged racial discrimination. In each
case, the defendant hospitals not only enjoyed tax exemptions but also
had been constructed with the aid of federal funding and were
licensed by the state.02 No state action was found in either case, the
court in Simkins concluding that "the exemption of the defendant
hospitals from ad valorem taxes is not a factor to be considered in
determining whether the hospitals are public agencies."68 Likewise,
the decision in Guillory v. Tulane University, 4 wherein the plaintiff
asserted a violation of his fourteenth amendment rights, strongly
dictates against the result reached in Jackson. Despite the fact that
state officers served as members of defendant's board of directors, tax
exemptions were granted, 5 the state had a reversionary interest in
defendant's property, and the property upon which defendant's uni-
versity was situated had been transferred from the state, the court
found no state action.
As evidenced by the cases relied upon by the Jackson majority,
viz., McGlotten, Pitts, and Falkenstein, tax exemptions alone have
been held to create a sufficient nexus with the state to fall within the
purview of the fourteenth amendment only when courts have been
faced with an established, formal policy of racial discrimination.66 It
59 See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
473, 490 (1962).
60211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
61215 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Va. 1963).
62211 F. Supp. at 632; 215 F. Supp. at 54.
68 211 F. Supp. at 636. Similarly, the court in Wood summarily held that tax exemp-
tion is no indication of state control. 215 F. Supp. at 58.
64212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
65 With reference to tax exempt status, the court stated,
[I]his court is unable to find legal support for the proposition that a simple grant
of state funds to a private institution, be it in the form of a tax exemption or
otherwise, is state action per se.... This court, without specific higher authority,
is unable to hold that a simple tax benefit evokes state action. Were that the law
then every citizen of the United States and every legal creature would be within
the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is not a scintilla of legal
precedent in that direction.
Id. at 685.
66 In Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972). the Fifth Circuit found state action,
although the tax-exempt defendant's racially discriminatory practices had not been for-
malized. However, the court found that the defendant's tax exemption was only one of
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is important to note the extreme difference in degree between alleging
racial discrimination in the failure to make a charitable gift, and the
flagrant exclusion of blacks from a fraternal organization pursuant to
the organization's bylaws. Additionally, these holdings are far from
conclusive since the Court in Moose Lodge was faced with identical
discriminatory conduct, yet failed to find state action. 7
Since the Jackson court's finding of state action appears unprece-
dented, the court's application of its five factor test to tax exemptions
warrants rigid scrutiny. The panel cited Norwood v. Harrison" and
Green v. Kennedy69 in determining that tax exemptions generally con-
stitute substantial assistance to charitable foundations. In Norwood,
however, a state textbook-lending scheme, not tax exemptions, was
being challenged. Moreover, in both cases, the courts were faced with
an attempt by the state to circumvent an order to desegregate public
schools, a situation wherein courts will understandably be more likely
to find a basis for state action. Undoubtedly, tax-exempt organizations
derive some benefit from the state, as do businessmen who take ad-
vantage of business deductions.70 However, in light of Supreme Court
treatment of government benefits in Moose Lodge and in Walz, it is
many factors leading to the conclusion that state action was present. In addition to being
a tax-exempt organization, the defendant in Smith was found to be a monopoly in that it
Ind operation of the defendant YMCA, and the city maintained an interest in
ant's property.
But see 27 Aim. L. REv. 146, 150 (1973), where the student author argues that the
Lodge Court should have weighed the tax benefits given to private clubs along
ie state liquor licensing scheme.
413 U.S. 455 (1973).
309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970).
See, e.g., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 n.37 (D.D.C. 1972), and
ities cited therein. Tax exemptions have been viewed as different in kind from
*orms of tangible financial assistance from the states. See Lewis, The Meaning of
ction, 60 CoLUrr. L REv. 1083 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Lewis], wherein the author
her forms of state assistance may be distinguishable from specific affirmative
Lnts in that they are available on a neutral basis and thus are less extraordinary.
x exemption for charitable institutions is an example. The theory supporting-,
h1 exemptions is that society benefits from the totalit of charitable organizations
n though only a few individuals may receive help from a given charity.
107-08.
nay well be that exempting charitable institutions from taxation is not aimed at
ng an economic benefit, but rather that such status is granted because there is no
ory way to compute their income, or due to the fact that some private institutions
at a loss or at too low a level of income to warrant taxation. See Bittker & Kaufman,
nd Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YA., LJ. 51,
972). Unfortunately, this rationale was not considered by the Jackson court. This
vould render a finding of state action totally incongruous with the rationale behind " -
ons.
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doubtful that a tax exemption standing alone can represent the basis
for a finding of state action.71
The economic benefit being an insufficient nexus with the state
to support a section 1983 claim, the court's second factor, viz., the
state's supervisory role with respect to tax-exempt foundations, must
be examined. Although racially discriminatory conduct was not alleged
in Walz, the Court's reasoning therein is enlightening. The Court felt
that the tax exemptions created only a minimal involvement between
church and state, which involvement would be less remote if defen-
dant religious organizations were taxed. A tax exemption, the Court
believed, "restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state,
and tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insu-
lating each from the other."72 This analysis clearly conflicts with the
Jackson court's reasoning.73 Furthermore, the one substantive limita-
tion embodied in the 1969 Tax Reform Act74 which the court found
so persuasive was not directed at supervising the awarding of grants
in a racially nondiscriminatory fashion. The Act was aimed at pre-
venting various abuses unrelated to racial discrimination.75 Accord-
ingly, the racial policies of an exempt foundation are not considered
in examinations of its tax returns.76
71 The Court in Moose Lodge stated:
The Court has never held ... that discrimination by an otherwise private entity
would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives
any sort of benefit ... from the State ....
407 U.S. at 173. Significantly, the Court did not consider the tax-exempt status of the
defendant organization. Moreover, in Wa, Justice Brennan emphasized the all-important
difference between tax exemptions and other forms of government assistance. 397 U.S. at
690-91 (Brennan, J., concurring).
723 97 U.S. at 676. The Jackson court cited Walz as standing for the proposition that
the granting of tax-exempt status to charitable foundations gives rise to a "'sustained
and detailed administrative relationship .... '" 496 F.2d at 630. In fact, the portion of
the Court's opinion so cited is inapposite to the assertion made by the Jackson court.
The Court was stating that a direct money subsidy would lead to a detailed administrative
relationship, but a tax exemption creates no such sustained involvement. 397 U.S. at 675.
78 But see McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 459 n.58 (D.D.C. 1972), wherein
the court states that the decision in Walz regarding the weight to be given tax exemptions
is attributable to historical considerations peculiar to the first amendment; Comment,
Tax Incentives As State Action, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 414, 424-25 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
7426 U.S.C. § 4945(g) (1970) (mandating the award of grants "on an objective and
nondiscriminatory basis").
75 These abuses include failure to distribute foundation income, control of private
businesses, and financial speculation through the use of foundation funds. Note, Private
Foundations and the 1969 Tax Reform Act, 7 COLUM. J. LAw & Soc. PROB. 240, 242-43 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Private Foundations]. For a discussion of the specific abuses which
gave rise to the 1969 Act and the reforms embodied therein see M. KATZ, THE MODERN
FOUNDATION: ITS DUAL CnArcTER, PUBLIC AND PIUVATE 16-18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
KAT'z]; J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLicY 205-06 (rev. ed. 1971).
76 See Simon, Foundations and Public Controversy: An Affirmative View, in TE FU-
TURE OF FOUNDAnONs 58, 83 (1973), where the author favors the Internal Revenue Service's
accountability requirements as applied to exempt organizations because such supervision
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As to the third requirement for state action, whether or not tax-
exempt status connotes government approval of an organization's ac-
tivities is a tenuous test. A favorable IRS ruling might only indicate
that a given foundation has been successful in cutting through govern-
mental red tape.77 In granting such status, the IRS merely stipulated
that the applicant falls within the broad definition of "charitable" set
forth in the Internal Revenue Code.78 One may conclude that such
approval is value neutral with respect to the programmatic aspects of
the exempted organization.
Finally, it is arguable that, with the increasing number of gov-
ernment welfare programs and social agencies in recent years, the
activities of private foundations overlap into areas now regarded as
"public functions." Yet, the importance of private philanthropy has
been widely regarded as residing in its freedom to act innovatively,
even controversially,79 in making a valuable contribution to American
pluralism.80 In holding that their grant-making is subject to the same
restraints imposed on governmental action, the Jackson court dimin-
ished the ability of private foundations to fulfill their unique pur-
pose."' Tax scholars are in disagreement concerning the adverse impact
of the 1969 Tax Reform Act on private philanthropy,82 but one spokes-
does not extend to programmatic control; Heimann, Foundations and Government: Per-
spectives for the Future, in THm FurURE OF FOUNDATIONS 259, 268 (1973). But see Comment,
supra note 73, at 464, where the author states that the supervisory role of the IRS has
become more active due to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and suggests that in the future
more control may be exercised over programmatic aspects of exempted organizations.
77 See Comment, supra note 73, at 461. In McGlotten, the court recognized that tax
exemptions are available to nonprofit clubs "regardless of the nature of the activity of the
particular dub." 338 F. Supp. at 462. See also Lewis, supra note 70, at 1107-08.
7826 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1970). See Friedman, Private Foundation-Government Rela-
tionships, in Tim FUrUR OF FOUNDATIONS 163, 184 (1973), where the author views the
IRS examination as "an objective audit system."
709 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 37. One author proposes that due to the relative freedom
enjoyed by private foundations, they may well have an obligation to involve themselves in
controversial fields. F. ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS 11, 19 (1956).
80 See Dillon, The Role of Private Philanthropy in Modern American Society, in TAx
I prars oN PHILANTHROPY 5, 7 (1972); Parrish, The Foundation: "A Special American
Institution," in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 7, 41 (1973); KATZ, supra note 75, at 3.
81 The opinion that private philanthropy's greatest asset is its freedom from govern-
mental restraints has been widely expressed. See, e.g., Andrews, Introduction, in FOUNDA-
TIONS: 20 VIEwPoIns 5, 6 (1965); Bittker, The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income
Tax Deduction For Private Philanthropy, in TAx ImPAcrs ON PHILANTHROPY 145, 167 (1972).
82 Some authors believe the 1969 Tax Reform Act has had a minimal effect on the
activities and financial outlook of private foundations. See, e.g., Kurz, Treasury's Experience
and Views, in TAx ImPAcrs ON PHILANTHROPY 23, 25 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kurz]. This
authority does, however, leave open the question whether the Act will impede private
philanthropy in the future. Other commentators fear the Act will have a negative effect
on the formation of new foundations. See Kunen, Effects of Act, in TAX IAPACrs ON
PIMLAHROPY 127 (1972). Various foundation representatives have testified to the adverse
effects already apparent. See Chance, Operational Effects and Dressner, Learning To Live
With the Tax Reform Act, in TAx ImpArs ON PHILANTHROPY 121 (1972). See also Labovitz,
1969 Tax Reforms Reconsidered, in TiE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 101 (1973).
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man for the Council on Foundations8 optimistically observed that the
Act still allowed foundations considerable flexibility. This flexibility,
however, has been seriously limited by the Jackson decision."
By finding that the conduct of defendant foundations constituted
state action for purposes of the plaintiff's section 1983 claim, the court
was attempting to eradicate the discriminatory distribution of grants.
Such a laudable purpose, however, does not serve to explain the court's
decision. No proof existed that the defendants practiced racial discrim-
ination; rather, the record disclosed that defendants had given gener-
ously to all races. Yet, the court seized upon this opportunity to
espouse a novel, far-sweeping extension of the state action doctrine.
No lower federal court had gone to this extreme, and the Supreme
Court, in Moose Lodge, appears to have brought a halt to the con-
tinued expansion of the state action doctrine.8 5
Aside from the absence of judicial precedent, the Jackson hold-
ing appears unwarranted when one considers its possible adverse effect
on the workings of charitable institutions. The vast majority of grants
are made by small foundations in communities 8 where contributions
to the arts, local charities and hospitals have a visible impact on local
constituencies.8 7 They serve as a valuable alternative to Washington-
based Government agencies over which local initiative has no con-
trol.8 8 The current fear is that if these small foundations do not act
innovatively to fulfill their unique potential, they will be emascu-
lated by amorphous government programs.8 9 At such an important
milestone in the evolving life of American private philanthropy, the
Jackson court has effectively roadblocked the path to innovation and
experimentation. Hopefully, other courts, cognizant of the dearth
83 Robert F. Goheen, chairman-elect of the Council on Foundations, Inc., as quoted in
Kurz, supra note 82, at 25-26.
84 One detailed study of the 1969 Act, cited by the court, strongly dictates against
the imposition of additional restraints. The author of the study believes the strictures
currently embodied in the Act seriously threaten the survival of private foundations.
Private Foundations, supra note 75, at 268-75. Increased administrative expenses incurred
by virtue of the new reporting scheme were felt to threaten private foundations already
in existence. Additionally, the Act may give rise to investment cautiousness resulting in an
overall reduction in monies for charitable endeavors. Those involved in innovative fields
will now gravitate toward more traditional undertakings, and many incentives for begin-
ning a new foundation have been destroyed. Indeed, many small foundations may well
terminate their status. See also Etherington, Effect on Donees, in TAX ImPACTS ON PHLAN-
THROPY 67, 70-71 (1972).
85 See note 13 supra.
86Friedman, Private Foundation- Government Relationships, in Tnm FUTURE OF
FOUNDATIONS 163, 166 (1973).
87 Id. at 168.
88 Id. at 181.
89 Id. at 167.
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of legal precedent, and mindful of the deleterious consequences,
will not adhere to the ill-conceived state action theory devised by the
Jackson panel.
Kate Monica Walsh
